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Abstract
We analyze how subjects’ self-assessment depends on whether its accu-
racy is observable to others. We find that women downgrade their self-
assessment given observability while men do not. Women avoid the shame
they may have if others observe that they overestimated themselves. Men,
however, do not seem to be similarly shame-averse. This gender difference
may be due to different societal expectations: While we find that men are
expected to be overconfident, women are not. Shame-aversion may explain
recent findings that women shy away from competition, demanding jobs and
wage negotiations, as entering these situations is a statement to be confident
of one’s ability.
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1 Introduction
Frequent and much discussed observations in labor markets are the absence of
women in top level jobs and the gender wage gap.1 Recent studies suggest that
this may be due to the fact that women in comparison to men shy away from
competition, demanding work environments, and negotiations about their wage.2
This behavior seems to be partly driven by women’s lower self-assessment of their
ability, higher risk-aversion and lower competitiveness.3
In this paper, we analyze another mechanism, the effect of shame, that may
imply gender differences in occupational decisions. Shame may also shed light
on why women exhibit a lower self-assessment. We define shame in our context
as the negative emotion that an individual may have when she is not as able
or successful as she publicly announced.4 For example, choosing a competitive or
demanding work environment can be seen as a public statement of being sufficiently
confident to succeed. An agent might feel ashamed if someone else (the employer
or competitor) observes her suffer defeat. Similarly, an agent might have shame if
subsequent to a wage (or promotion) negotiation the employer observes that the
agent is not as able as she claimed to be. Agents may want to avoid shame and
thus make less confident statements about their abilities or even shy away from
situations in which they might end up feeling ashamed. Specifically, we investigate
whether women make less confident statements about their ability when their true
ability is observable than if it is not – because they want to avoid the shame of
overestimating their ability – and whether men’s statements are less sensitive to
the observability of their ability.
We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment, in which the subjects first
1See, e.g., Bertrand and Hallock (2001).
2For example, Balafoutas and Sutter (2012), Charness et al. (2011), Datta Gupta, Poulsen,
and Villeval (2011), Dohmen and Falk (2011), and Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) show that
women are less competitive than men; Niederle and Yestrumskas (2008) show that women choose
challenging tasks less often than men; Babcock (2002), Bowles et al. (2005), and Gerhart and
Rynes (1991) show that women negotiate their wage less than men.
3There exist other explanations for gender differences in the labor market such as discrimina-
tion against women and preference differences regarding e.g. child rearing (see, e.g., Altonji and
Blank, 1999; Goldin and Rouse, 2000).
4In questionnaire studies, psychologists analyze which emotions individuals classify as shame.
A consistent definition of shame, however, does not exist. In particular, the distinction between
shame and embarrassment is strongly debated. For an overview see Sabini et al. (2001).
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perform an incentivized real task. Afterwards, they are randomly assigned to be
principals and agents. One principal is matched with two agents. The agents
estimate the relative rank of their performance in the real task compared to other
participants and receive a payment if their guessed rank is correct. According to
their monetary incentives, agents should state the rank they think is most likely
correct.
To isolate the effect of shame, we vary the (potential) exposure to shame
across two treatments. In both treatments, the principal observes the agents’
self-assessments. The only difference between the two treatments is that in one
treatment (Info) the principal additionally observes the agents’ true ranks, i.e.
the principal can infer whether the agents over- (or under-) estimated themselves.
In the other treatment (NoInfo), the principal does not observe the agents’ true
ranks and thus cannot infer the accuracy of the agents’ self-assessments. Note that
if agents state a lower rank in Info than in NoInfo (given equal performance in
both treatments), then, the only obvious explanation is that agents try to avoid
shame. Social preferences, overconfidence per se, risk-aversion or preferences for
competition cannot explain a treatment difference in guessed ranks as we only vary
the observability of the accuracy of the agents’ self-assessment.
In our experiment, we find neither a gender difference in performance, nor a
performance difference between treatments. Yet, we observe that women in Info
rank themselves significantly lower than women in NoInfo. For men, we observe
no significant treatment effect; if anything, the effect is in the opposite direc-
tion. Thus, shame-aversion might explain the different behavior of women and
men in settings in which others observe or learn over time the accuracy of their
self-assessment. Shame-aversion may also partly explain the frequently observed
gender difference in self-assessment.5 While we also find that women rank them-
selves significantly lower than men in treatment Info, the gender difference in
guessed ranks disappears in NoInfo.
5For gender differences in self-assessment see, e.g., Balafoutas, Kerschbamer, and Sutter
(forthcoming), Beyer (1990), Beyer and Bowden (1997), Mo¨bius et al. (2011), Niederle, Se-
gal, and Vesterlund (2010), Reuben et al. (forthcoming). It is, however, difficult to compare the
size of the gender difference in self-assessment between studies and whether shame or the absence
of shame drives differences between studies since experimental conditions vary, in particular, how
the self-assessment is elicited.
3
In addition, it seems that to some extent women downgrade their guessed ranks
consciously: In Info, significantly more women (compared to NoInfo) think that
if their guessed rank is not correct, then their actual rank will rather be superior
than they guessed previously.
What causes the shame to overestimate (and not to underestimate) oneself?
In a post-experimental questionnaire almost 90% of the subjects indicate that
overestimating oneself is deemed negatively in society. In contrast, only about
20% state that underestimating oneself is deemed negatively in society. Yet, we
observe no gender difference in these statements. But we find that subjects expect
men but not women to overestimate their performance in the real task. Given
these expectations, women in comparison to men may (believe they) worsen their
social standing to a greater extent when overestimating themselves and others
observe it. This may imply that only women downgrade their self-assessment in
Info due to a stronger (anticipated) social disapproval of their overconfidence.6
Regardless of the root cause for the shame to overestimate oneself, we find
that women are more shame-averse than men. Women’s shame-aversion may lead
to more cautious behavior and self-promotion? when their performance becomes
verifiable afterwards: For example, in wage negotiations, women may ask for lower
wages than men or may not ask for a wage increase at all because their claim
reflects their belief about their ability. Similarly, women may not enter competitive
environments because entering expresses a high confidence in their ability but the
outcome may disprove that they are of high ability.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe our experimental
design. In Section 3, we report our basic results. In Section 4, we provide a
closer look at the effect of shame, analyzing whether individuals are aware of the
reactions to shame and of the gender difference in self-assessment. We also discuss
why only women seem to be shame-averse. We conclude in Section 5.
6Evidence from the psychological literature suggests that the society evaluates the same kind
of behavior differently for men and women. Bowles, Babcok, and Lai (2007) find that women are
penalized when trying to negotiate a higher wage, while men are not. Eagly (1987) and Rudman
(1998) show that self-promoting women are evaluated worse than modest women, while there is
no such difference for men.
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2 Experimental Design
In our experiment, subjects are randomly assigned to the roles of principals and
agents.7 One third of the participants are principals, the remaining two thirds are
agents. Participants are randomly matched into groups of three, where each group
consists of one principal and two agents. The setting is completely anonymous.
Participants do not learn the identity of the other subjects in their group, neither
during nor after the experiment. Before learning about the two different roles
and the allocation to groups, all participants perform a real task. Afterwards, the
agents’ assess their relative performance in the real task (explained below). To not
distort effort, subjects do not know about the self-assessment when completing
the real task. Participants only know that another part of the experiment will
follow. Participants receive separate instructions for the real task and for the self-
assessment part and complete each part only once. The instructions are handed
out to participants and read aloud at the beginning of the experiment and after
the real task, respectively.8
In the real task, subjects add up sets of five two-digit numbers. Subjects are
not allowed to use a calculator, but to use the provided scratch paper. After a
subject has entered and confirmed her result for a set of numbers, a new set of
numbers appears on the screen. Once a result has been confirmed, subjects cannot
go back and revise their result. On the screen, the task looks as follows:
54 27 63 10 89 Result:
Each set of numbers is randomly generated. Subjects perform this task for 7.5
minutes. They may solve as many problems as they can. On the screen, they
see the remaining time as well as their number of correctly and wrongly solved
problems by then. Before the 7.5 minutes start, there is a practice phase of two
minutes during which subjects can get acquainted with the software interface while
no money is earned. We chose the number-adding task as performance depends
not only on effort but also on ability.9 Furthermore, the task is easy to understand
7The experiment was framed neutrally. While we refer to “principals” and “agents” in the
following, we used the neutral terms participant A and B to describe the roles in the experiment.
8See the appendix for the instructions.
9Thus, subjects may base their self-assessment not only on their performance in this task but
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and the performance is easy to measure. In addition, several other studies use this
task and predominantly do not observe a gender differences in performance.10
Each agent receives two tokens for every arithmetic problem she solves cor-
rectly.11 Principals receive no payment for the real task. When adding the sets
of numbers, however, subjects do not know their role and thus neither whether
they will be paid for the real task. They only know that two thirds of all subjects,
which are randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment, receive two
tokens per correct answer, while the remaining third receives no payment for the
real task. As soon as the real task is finished, subjects learn their role.
After having completed the real task, each subject is assigned (but not told) a
rank between 1 and 22, which ranks her performance in the real task relative to
the performance of 21 other participants. Rank 1 refers to the best performance
in the group of 22 subjects and rank 22 to the worst performance. Each subject is
ranked to the same 21 other participants. These 21 other participants completed
the identical real task in another session (“baseline treatment”) and had exactly
the same instructions and incentives for this task.12 As a subject is compared
to the 21 participants of the baseline treatment, her rank is independent of the
performance of the other subjects in her session.
More precisely, the ranking is determined as follows. A subject is assigned
rank r ∈ {1, ..., 22} if she performed better or as good as 22− r participants of the
baseline treatment. A subject performed better than a participant of the baseline
treatment if she solved more problems correctly. In case she solved the same
number of problems correctly, the subject is better if she made less mistakes. The
also on their performance in school, study, etc. This is confirmed by our results as the estimated
relative performance is correlated with the grade in the final secondary school examinations
(abitur) in the following called final school-grade (cf. Section 3).
10See, for example, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Balafoutas, Kerschbamer, and Sutter
(2011), and Eriksson, Poulsen, and Villeval (2009). An exception is Niederle, Segal, and Vester-
lund (2010). Note, however, that a gender difference in performance would not be a problem in
our experiment as we mainly analyze treatment effects for each gender separately (as we explain
in more detail below) rather than gender differences within one treatment.
11During the experiment subjects earned tokens. At the end of the experiment, tokens were
converted into Euros where 1 token=0.25 Eurocent.
12The baseline treatment was the first session that we conducted and we only use it to determine
the performance ranking. Nevertheless, we kept it as similar as possible to the subsequent
sessions, and thus also included the self-assessment part, with the difference that in the baseline
treatment subjects were ranked relative to the subjects of their session.
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subject performed as good as a participant of the baseline treatment if both solved
the same number of problems correctly and made the same number of mistakes.
Each agent is asked to estimate her rank between 1 and 22. In the following, we
refer to an agent’s estimate as her “guessed rank”.13 If an agent’s guessed rank is
correct, i.e. equals her actual rank, she receives 50 tokens (12.50 Euros). Whereas
she receives no payment if her guessed rank differs from her actual rank.14
In each group, the agent whose guessed rank is better, is automatically “chosen”
– irrespective of the accuracy of her guessed rank.15 Note that a better guessed
rank means that the stated number is smaller and not that the guessed rank is
closer to the actual rank. The actual performance of the chosen agent affects
the expected payment of the principal.16 The principal receives a payment of
(22− rank) · 3 tokens, whereupon the rank is either the actual rank of the chosen
agent or a random rank between 1 and 22, both with equal probability. Thus, the
better the actual rank (i.e. the smaller the stated number) of the chosen agent, the
higher the expected payoff of the principal. The principal does not learn whether
the actual rank of the chosen agent or a random rank determines her payoff. We
introduced the random rank to avoid that the principal can deduce the agent’s
actual rank from her payoff. This is crucial as in one treatment (see NoInfo below)
the principal is not supposed to learn the agents’ actual ranks. An agent receives
13To be precise, the principals also guess their rank, yet, their guessed rank has no payoff
consequences and is of no further interest for us. We let them guess their rank to keep them
busy and to avoid that participants can infer who is a principal due to their inactivity.
14This “all-or-nothing” payment rule has the advantage that it is easy to understand and it
ensures that each subject has the incentive to state the rank which she thinks is most likely her
actual rank (i.e. to state the mode of the ranks on which she places a positive probability) –
irrespective of her risk-preferences. A quadratic-scoring rule in contrast is much more difficult
to understand. In addition, the use of a quadratic-scoring rule is problematic if subjects are not
risk-neutral (see, e.g., Holt, 1986; and Savage, 1971). Since women tend to be more risk-averse
than men (see Eckel and Grossmann (2008) or Croson and Gneezy (2009) for an overview), a
quadratic-scoring rule may induce gender differences in guessed ranks, which we want to avoid.
Finally, we want to implement steep incentives to state one’s “true” guessed rank, but under a
quadratic scoring rule they are rather flat as small deviations or mistakes are cheap.
15If both agents in a group have the same guessed rank, one of them is randomly chosen. The
selection occurs automatically to avoid confounding effects.
16We form groups of two agents and one principal to generate more observations of agents’
self-assessments compared to a matching of one agent and one principal. The prinicpal’s earnings
depend on the agents’ self-assessments and the chosen agent’s performance (i) to intensify the
principal-agent relationship in the anonymous laboratory situation and (ii) to make the setting
more reasonable and realistic (cf. an application or wage negotiation setting).
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no payment for being chosen. We only set incentives to correctly guess the rank.
We deliberately abstract from monetary incentives for being chosen to isolate the
effect of shame. Such monetary incentives might induce agents to overstate their
ability for strategic reasons, i.e. to lie. There might not only be gender differences
in the willingness to lie in general but also depending on whether lying can be
detected.17
At the end of the experiment, each agent learns her actual rank and whether
she is chosen or not. The principal learns the guessed ranks of both agents in
her group and – depending on the treatment – she additionally learns the agents’
actual ranks. This means, we vary the principal’s information about the agents’
actual ranks across treatments. In the first treatment (“NoInfo”), the principal
only learns the guessed ranks of both agents but not their actual ranks. In the
second treatment (“Info”), the principal learns the guessed and the actual ranks of
her agents. Before guessing their ranks, the agents are informed that the principal
learns their guessed ranks and whether or not she additionally learns their actual
ranks. Note that the setting is completely anonymous, i.e. the principal is shown
the agents’ guessed and/or actual ranks on the screen but the agents’ identities
are not revealed.
How can a treatment difference in the agents’ guessed ranks be explained?
The only difference between treatments is whether or not the principal learns
the agents’ actual ranks; the agent’s monetary incentives for their guessed ranks
are identical in both treatments. Therefore, risk preferences, social preferences,
preferences for competition or overconfidence per se cannot explain a treatment
difference in guessed ranks. What can explain the treatment difference is shame.
An agent may have shame if the principal can infer the accuracy of the agent’s
guessed rank (as in Info). In particular, an agent may feel ashamed if she stated to
be better than she turns out to be, i.e. if she overestimated herself. To avoid this
shame, the agent may guess a worse rank when the principal learns the accuracy of
her guessed rank. In our setting an agent’s shame might be intensified by the fact
that the guessed ranks also determine which agent is chosen and thereby whose
17For example, Charness et al. (2011) find that men tend to increase their self-assessment for
strategic reasons, while women do not. The studies by Houser et al. (2010) and Lundquist et al.
(2009) indicate that women are less likely to lie.
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actual performance affects the principal’s expected payoff.18
Evidence from psychology suggests that women experience emotions more in-
tensely than men – according to self-reports (see e.g. Brody, 1997; and Grossman
and Wood, 1993). Women’s stronger emotional experience can increase their disu-
tility from overestimating themselves. Due to the gender difference in emotional
experience and to anecdotal evidence from personnel managers that women shy
away from promoting their abilities, we expect that particularly women have shame
and try to avoid it by guessing a worse rank in Info. Thus, we propose the first
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The guessed ranks of women in Info are worse than in NoInfo.
Since we expect men to be less prone to shame, we state the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Men’s guessed ranks in Info and NoInfo do not differ.
Moreover, we expect that shame largely explains the gender gap in self-assessment
– given that men and women have the same ability – and state as third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Women assess themselves lower than men in Info. The gender
gap in self-assessment in NoInfo is strictly smaller than in Info.
Additional questions after the elicitation of the guessed rank:
In both treatments, we elicit additional information from all subjects before in-
forming them about the accuracy of their guessed rank. First, we ask each subject
whether she thinks that her actual rank would rather be better or worse than she
previously estimated in case her guessed rank would turn out to be wrong. Sub-
jects, whose guessed rank indeed turns out to be wrong, receive two tokens if their
18Apart from the shame subjects may have if the principal observes that they overestimated
themselves, subjects may feel ashamed just because they themselves learn that they overesti-
mated themselves or because the experimenter learns it. Both kinds of shame towards oneself
and the experimenter, however, cannot explain a treatment difference: Agents learn their actual
ranks and thus the accuracy of their guess in both treatments and also the experimenter always
observes the accuracy of guessed ranks. When we talk about shame in the following, we refer to
the shame agents feel towards the principal.
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answer is correct. This question may shed light on whether subjects are aware of
their potentially different behavior in the two treatments. Second, we elicit the
subjects’ beliefs about the average actual rank and the average guessed rank of
all female as well as of all male agents in their session. These beliefs provide an
insight into whether people expect a general tendency to over- or underestimation
and gender differences in self-assessment. One of these four estimates is randomly
chosen for payment and subjects receive 16 tokens if their corresponding answer
is correct.19
To summarize the course of the experiment, Figure 1 illustrates the order in
which subjects take their actions and and receive information.
Figure 1: Course of the experiment
Finally, the subjects complete a questionnaire, which asks for their gender, age,
subject of study, final school-grade, and elicits their risk preferences and degree of
self-esteem. In addition, we ask subjects whether they think that over- (under-)
estimating oneself is deemed negatively in society.
We conducted the computerized experiment in the Munich Experimental Lab-
oratory for Economic and Social Sciences (MELESSA) at the University of Munich
during April 2011. Participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Includ-
ing the baseline treatment, 171 subjects participated in our experiment (mainly
students from the universities in Munich). The experiment was programmed and
conducted with the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were assigned
19To avoid any kind of hedging strategies, all five additional, incentivized questions were not
announced in the instructions.
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individual computer terminals and could not see other participants’ decisions. We
ran four sessions per treatment. Subjects were randomly assigned to sessions and
could take part in one session only. The gender composition of each session was
roughly half women and half men.20 Each session lasted about one hour and
subjects earned 14.93 Euros on average (including a show-up fee of 4 Euros).
3 Main Experimental Results
Table 1 shows for each gender and treatment the number of observations, the
average number of correctly solved problems (average number correct), the average
guessed rank and the corresponding standard deviations.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Treatment
# obser- average number average guessed
vations correct (s.d.) rank (s.d.)
Women
NoInfo 25 16.20 (5.28) 7.80 (3.64)
Info 24 15.87 (5.03) 10.25 (4.59)
Men
NoInfo 25 17.20 (5.24) 6.80 (3.28)
Info 26 16.84 (6.81) 6.38 (4.48)
The sample consists of all agents. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
Neither women’s nor men’s performance differs between treatments: Female agents
solve on average 16.20 problems correctly in NoInfo and 15.87 in Info, whereas
male agents solve on average 17.2 problems correctly in NoInfo and 16.84 in Info
(two-sided Mann-Whitney-U-tests (MWU-test) yield p = 0.779 and p = 0.799 for
women and men, respectively). Although women’s performance is the same in
both treatments, women rank themselves significantly worse in Info by as much
as 2.45 ranks on average (MWU-test, p = 0.035, two-sided): In NoInfo, women’s
average guessed rank is 7.80, while it is 10.25 in Info. This observation confirms
our first hypothesis.
20We invited the same number of men and women to each session. Due to different show-ups,
however, not exactly 50% men and women participated.
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Result 1: Women state significantly lower beliefs about their performance if the
accuracy of their self-assessment is observable.
The guessed ranks of men, in contrast, do not differ significantly between treat-
ments (MWU-test, p=0.394, two-sided), which confirms our second hypothesis. If
anything, the effect even goes in the opposite direction: In NoInfo, their average
guessed rank is 6.80, while it is 6.38 in Info. Possibly men want to show the princi-
pal that they are very convinced of their ability by stating a better rank especially
if the principal can observe the true performance.
Result 2: There is no significant difference between men’s stated beliefs about
their performance when the accuracy of their self-assessment is observable or not.
From these observations we conclude that women feel ashamed if they state a
better rank than they actually have in case their actual rank is observable. To
avoid this shame they downgrade their self-assessment. Men do not have this kind
of shame or are at least less shame-averse than women such that their (incentivized)
self-assessment does not change.
Since only women but not men downgrade their beliefs in Info, shame-aversion
may at least partly explain the frequently observed gender gap in self-assessment.
Next, we therefore compare the gender gap in self-assessment across treatments.
In Info, women rank themselves significantly and substantially worse than men
by almost 4 ranks on average (MWU-test, p = 0.004 , two-sided): The average
guessed rank of women is 10.25, while it is 6.38 for men. This gender gap in
guessed ranks is not driven by a different performance of women and men as their
number of correctly solved problems (cf. Table 1) does not differ significantly
(two-sided MWU-tests yield p = 0.613/0.520/0.520 for Info/NoInfo/both treat-
ments pooled).21 Figure 2 illustrates this observation for the pooled sample of
both treatments.22 Thus, in treatment Info, we confirm earlier evidence on women
stating lower beliefs about their performance than men. Yet, we cannot confirm
21Men solve on average one problem more than women. Yet, this result is rather driven by
some high-performing men (i.e. outliers) and not representative for the whole group (cf. Figure
2).
22The figure looks very similar for each treatment.
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Figure 2: Distribution of correctly solved problems
the finding that women state lower beliefs in treatment NoInfo (cf. Table 1).
In NoInfo the gender difference in guessed ranks is not significant (MWU-test,
p = 0.349, two-sided). Hence, our observations confirm Hypothesis 3 and suggest
that women are not less self-confident than men per se but are rather more modest
and reserved when others learn whether they over- or underestimated themselves.
Result 3: Women state significantly lower beliefs about their performance than
men if the accuracy of their self-assessment is observable, otherwise, the gender
difference in self-assessment disappears.
The previous results are confirmed by ordered probit regressions (see Table 2),
where we regress the guessed rank on performance (number of correctly solved
problems), a female dummy, a dummy for treatment Info, and risk attitude.23 In
specifications (1a) and (2a), we include further controls: age, final school-grade, a
dummy for a quantitative orientation in the subject of study (economics, math-
23To elicit risk preferences, individuals indicated on a scale ranging from 0 to 10 whether they
are willing to take risks (or try to avoid risks). 0 represented a very weak willingness to take
risks, while 10 represented a strong willingness to take risks. Dohmen et al. (2005) show that
this general risk question is a good predictor of actual risk-taking behavior.
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ematics, natural sciences), self-esteem, number of siblings, and a dummy that is
one if an agent’s mother is not working.24 In specifications (2), we additionally
include an interaction term for female and Info. In all specifications, we consider
the guessed ranks between 12 and 22 as one category, as only 16 of all 100 par-
ticipants rank themselves worse than rank 11. Table 2 summarizes the regression
results. The reference category is man in NoInfo.
Table 2: Ordered Probit of Guessed Rank
Coefficient (Robust Std. Error)
(1) (1a) (2) (2a)
Performance -0.113*** -0.126*** -0.115*** -0.125***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022)
Female 0.457*** 0.414** 0.035 -0.112
(0.178) (0.171) (0.099) (0.172)
Info 0.168 0.097 -0.265 -0.414
(0.183) (0.200) (0.162) (0.154)
Female∗Info 0.890*** 1.071***
(0.200) (0.297)
Risk attitude -0.123** -0.133* -0.127** -0.133*
(0.055) (0.073) (0.051) (0.070)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
# of observations 100 100 100 100
# of sessions 8 8 8 8
Pseudo R-squared 0.085 0.125 0.095 0.137
Log Pseudo Likelihood -215.6 -206.2 -213.4 -203.3
The sample consists of all agents and the regression clusters on sessions. The additional
controls are final school-grade, subject of study, age, number of siblings, degree of self-esteem,
dummy for mother working or not.
The number of correctly solved problems (performance) is a strong predictor for
the guessed rank. The result is robust over both specifications.25 In specifications
24The additional information stems from self-reported questionnaire responses at the end of
the experiment. Self-esteem is measured by Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale, where a higher
score indicates a higher self-esteem.
25Note that the performance in the number adding task is neither correlated with the final
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(1), the coefficient of the female dummy is positive and significant, meaning that a
woman states a worse rank than a man. The coefficient of the treatment dummy,
however, is not significant. Thus, when looking at the sample of all agents, men
and women, guessed ranks do not differ between treatments. Yet, in specifications
(2), the interaction effect is positive and significant and, moreover, the coefficient
of the female dummy becomes insignificant. This confirms Results 1 - 3.
Given that our focus is on people’s (women’s) shame to overestimate them-
selves, it is interesting to see whether there is indeed a tendency to overestimation
in the number-adding task. Empirical evidence often suggests that people tend
to overestimate their abilities, yet, overconfidence seems to depend on the task,
the incentives, and the techniques to elicit self-confidence.26 To address the issue
of overestimation, we next consider the average “accuracy” of the agents’ guessed
ranks. A meaningful measure of accuracy should take account of the fact that the
group of 21 participants in the baseline treatment – which determines a subject’s
‘actual rank’ in the experiment – is relatively small and might contain outliers.
Therefore, we calculate the accuracy of an agent’s guessed rank as the difference
between her guessed rank and her “modal rank”, which is the rank most likely
assigned to her given the observed performance distribution of all participants in
all sessions.27 If an agent’s guessed rank coincides with her modal rank, her ac-
curacy is 0, whereas a negative (positive) accuracy means that she over- (under-)
estimated herself. According to our measure of accuracy, the majority of subjects
overestimates the relative performance. This holds true for women and men in
each treatment (63-80 % overestimate themselves). Women and men similarly
overestimate themselves in NoInfo. The average accuracy for women is -4.32 and
for men it is -4.16 (MWU-test, p = 0.922, two-sided). Yet, women tend to overes-
school-grade nor with the quantitative subject of study dummy (Spearman rank order correlation,
Spearman’s ρ = 0.021/0.127, p = 0.834/0.207, N = 100). Yet, the coefficient of the final school-
grade is positive and significant, meaning that subjects who performed better at school guess a
better rank.
26See e.g., Benoit and Dubra (2011), Burks et al. (2010), Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005), Klay-
man et al. (1999), and Pulford and Colman (1997).
27To determine the modal rank for every possible performance level, we ran a Monte-Carlo
simulation. We randomly drew 500,000 groups consisting of 21 participants out of the perfor-
mance distribution of all participants (with replacement). We then calculated for any given
performance level the rank within each simulated group. The modal rank equals the mode of all
500,000 simulated ranks.
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timate themselves less than men in Info (the average accuracy of women is -2.25,
while it is -5.15 for men). The difference is marginally significant (MWU-test,
p = 0.077, two-sided).28
Given that many women overestimate their relative performance but guess
worse ranks in Info, one might wonder whether women’s guessed ranks become
more accurate in Info due to shame-aversion. This would presume that rather
those women who show a tendency to overestimate themselves downgrade their
beliefs due to shame-aversion (e.g. because they are to some extent aware of their
tendency to overestimate themselves). Indeed, when we consider the absolute
accuracy of women’s beliefs, on average, women’s guessed ranks are closer to the
modal rank in Info. Yet, the difference is not significant (MWU-test, p = 0.292,
two-sided), which suggests that shame-aversion also affects those women, who tend
to underestimate their performance. For men, we observe no significant treatment
effect in the absolute accuracy either.
4 What causes the gender difference in shame?
We observe that women state a worse rank in Info than in NoInfo while men
(though insignificantly) state a weakly better rank in Info than in NoInfo. Before
we try to explain why men and women react differently to the potential exposure
to shame, we analyze whether subjects adjust their guessed rank consciously or out
of habit when someone else learns their guessed rank as well as their actual rank.
To get a first indication, we ask the agents, after they submitted their guessed
rank but before they know if it was correct, whether they think that their actual
rank would rather be better or worse than their guessed rank in case the latter
turned out to be wrong. Subjects receive two tokens (0.5 Euro) if their guessed
rank indeed turns out to be wrong and their answer is correct.
For women, the answers differ across treatments: In NoInfo, 77% of women
respond that they would have a worse rank than they previously guessed, while
in Info only 50% say so (Chi2, p = 0.059, two-sided). This finding suggests that
28If we use the agents’ actual instead of modal ranks, gender differences across treatments
are not affected, only the level of overestimation is lower as subjects in the baseline treatment
performed slightly worse than participants in the experiment on average.
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women are at least partly aware of their reaction to shame. They seem to con-
sciously avoid shame even in the anonymous laboratory setting. Similarly, men
seem to anticipate that they state better ranks in Info: In Info, 76% indicate they
would rather have a worse rank, while in NoInfo only 64% do so. However, as for
men’s guessed ranks, the treatment difference is not significant (Chi2, p = 0.311,
two-sided). Nevertheless, one might take these findings as a (weak) indication that
men consciously state a better rank in Info.
But why do only women consciously avoid shame? Our observations provide
some evidence that women’s shame-aversion may be attributed to social conven-
tions. We ask the subjects in the questionnaire whether they think that overes-
timating oneself is deemed negatively in society. 85% of all subjects say “yes”.
In comparison, only 21% say that underestimating oneself is deemed negatively
in society.29 These observations can explain, why people have shame when they
overestimate themselves, but not if they underestimate themselves. People ex-
pect their social image to suffer, when overestimating themselves. Thus, people
who care about their social image may try to avoid to overestimate themselves (by
stating worse ranks) when others can observe the accuracy of their self-assessment.
Yet, we do not observe any gender difference in the answers to both questions. This
implies that the mere willingness to keep one’s social image up cannot explain the
gender difference in guessed ranks that we observe when shame is possible.
So why are only women shame-averse? First, as aforementioned, psychological
studies suggest that women perceive emotions stronger than men. Hence, women
might experience shame and the negative attitude towards overconfidence more
intensely and thus react to it much stronger. Second, there might be a more neg-
ative societal attitude towards self-promoting women than towards self-promoting
men (see, e.g., Eagly, 1987; Rudman, 1998).
Third, we find that women, in contrast to men, are not expected to be over-
confident. We ask subjects to estimate the average actual rank of women and
men and the average guessed rank of women and men in their session (estimates
can be given accurate to one-tenth of a rank). For each subject one question
29Possible answers to both questions are “yes” and “no”. We varied the order of the two
questions and restrict to the first question here (even more subjects say that overestimation is
deemed negatively when it is the second question). We pool both treatments as the results are
very similar.
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is randomly selected and the subject receives 16 tokens (4 Euros) if her answer
does not differ more than +/- 1 rank from the true value.30 For each subject, we
calculate her estimated accuracy of women (“EAW”) and her estimated accuracy
of men (“EAM”) as the difference between her estimated average guessed rank
of women/men minus her estimated average rank of women/men. When asked
about women, the majority of subjects (52%/64% in Info/NoInfo ) expects them
to be underconfident, the median of EAW being positive (0.6 and 1 rank in Info
and NoInfo, resp.); whereas when asked about men, the majority (50%/76% in
Info/NoInfo) expects them to be overconfident, the median of EAM being nega-
tive (-0.25 and -2 ranks in Info and NoInfo, resp.).31 The expectations about men
and women differ significantly in the sense that women are rather expected to be
underconfident than men.32 Figure 3 illustrates for each treatment the fractions of
subjects expecting that women and men, respectively, overestimate, underestimate
or correctly estimate their rank in the experiment.
Given that women are not expected to be overconfident, a women’s reputation
might suffer more when she is overconfident. In other words, a woman who is
overconfident may be perceived more negatively than an overconfident man – or
at least the woman may expect a stronger negative attitude towards her overconfi-
dence. In reaction to this (perceived) unequal treatment, women may downgrade
their beliefs about their performance if others can infer the accuracy of the beliefs.
Hence, society rather observes that women appear less overconfident than men,
which reinforces the expectations.
Fourth, educational differences may foster women’s shame: Girls may rather
be taught to be modest and reticent, while boys are taught to be self-confident and
tough – which in turn may shape society’s expectations. Women might have inter-
nalized these principles and may feel shame in case they do not behave accordingly
and others observe it.
30We ask these four questions in four different orders to control for order effects. We varied the
order of the gender as well as the order of guessed and actual rank. According to MWU-tests,
there are no significant order effects.
31Recall that a better rank equals a lower number such that a negative (positive) EAW or
EAM corresponds to expected overestimation (underestimation).
32Wilcoxon signed rank tests indicate that in both treatments EAW is higher than EAM (p =
0.000/0.023 for NoInfo/Info, two-sided) and more subjects expect that women are underconfident
compared to men (p = 0.000/0.053 for NoInfo/Info, two-sided).
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Figure 3: Expectations about Subjects’ Self-Assessment Accuracy
5 Conclusion
We analyze in a laboratory experiment whether individuals’ (incentivized) self-
assessment of their performance depends on whether its accuracy is observable to
others. We find that women state a lower belief about their performance in case
another person learns the accuracy of their self-assessment than if the accuracy
is not observable. This behavior can be attributed to shame-aversion: women
try to avoid feeling ashamed if another person observes that they overestimated
themselves. Men, however, seem to be less prone to shame-aversion: They do not
downgrade their beliefs in case the accuracy of their beliefs is observable.
Women’s behavior as well as the observed gender difference in behavior cannot
be explained by risk preferences, social preferences, preferences for competition or
overconfidence per se: Our results are based on treatment comparisons and the
only variation across treatments is whether another person observes an individual’s
actual performance in addition to her estimated performance.
We also find some indications why only women are shame-averse. Women
may expect or actually face a stronger social disapproval if they overestimate
themselves: We elicit subjects’ beliefs suggesting that men but not women are
expected to overestimate themselves.
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Note that the interaction of subjects in the experiment is completely anony-
mous and the only treatment variation is that one other subject observes an agent’s
self-assessment accuracy. Thus, the effect of shame is presumably even stronger in
reality when the agent’s actions are observable to more than one person and the
agent and the observer(s) know each other.
Our observations contribute to the discussion why women are underrepresented
in leading positions and why the gender wage gap is huge although women are
equally educated and equally able (according to their grades) than men. Women
might present themselves worse than men when applying for jobs and might not
negotiate their wages because they want to avoid the shame they have if they
turn out to be worse than they claimed to be. Similarly, they might not enter
competitive or demanding work environments as this could be interpreted as a
statement of being sufficiently confident to succeed and they are afraid if oth-
ers observe them being unsuccessful. Our experiment provides first evidence of
women’s shame-aversion. Yet, further research is needed to pin down the impact
of shame-aversion in more complex settings.
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Appendix
General Instructions 33
Welcome to this experiment. Please read these instructions carefully and follow
the instructions on your screen when the experiment has started. At the end of the
experiment you will be paid in cash according to your decisions and the decisions
of other participants as described in the following. In addition, you receive a fixed
payment of 4 Euros for showing-up. During the experiment you are not allowed to
speak to other participants, to use cell phones or to start any other programs on the
computer. If you break this rule, we have to exclude you from the experiment and
its pay-out. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter
will then come to your seat to answer your questions.
During the experiment we do not speak of Euros but of points. Your earnings
will be calculated in points first. At the end of the experiment your points will be
converted into Euros whereupon applies:
1 point = 25 Eurocents.
The experiment consists of two parts and a questionnaire. Part 1 is explained in
more detail in the following. As soon as all participants have finished part 1, you
receive the instructions for part 2. Subsequent to part 2, there is a questionnaire.
Instructions Part 1
In Part 1 of the experiment you will be asked to add five two-digit numbers at a
time. Please enter your result in the corresponding box and click “Confirm”. Once
you have confirmed your result, five new numbers appear, irrespective of whether
your result was correct or wrong. On the screen, you will see whether your last
result was correct or wrong and how many problems you have solved correctly
and accordingly falsely so far. You are not allowed to use a calculator, but the
provided scratch paper, to calculate the results. Overall, you have a time period
of 7.5 minutes. During this time you can work on as many problems as you can.
The remaining time will be shown top right on the screen. After the 7.5 minutes
33Original instructions were in German and are available from the authors upon request.
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have passed, part 1 is completed and you will receive the instructions for part 2.
Your payment for part 1:
Whether part 1 or only part 2 of the experiment will be relevant for your payment,
has been randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment. Two thirds of
all participants will be paid for their performance in part 1. They get 2 points for
each correctly solved problem. For one third of the participants, the payment will
be based on part 2 of the experiment only. At the beginning of part 2, you will be
informed on your screen whether you will be paid for part 1.
Procedure of part 1:
As soon as all participants have read these instructions, there will be a test phase
of 2 minutes. During this time you can get used to the screen, the handling and the
type of problems. You will receive no payment for the test phase. Subsequently,
the 7.5 minutes – as described above – will start.
Instructions Part 2
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant was randomly assigned to the
role A or B. Two thirds of the participants were assigned to role A (“participant
A”) and one third to role B (“participant B”). Which role has been assigned to
you, will be shown to you on your screen at the beginning of part 2. If you were
assigned to role A, at the end of the experiment you will receive 2 points for every
problem you solved correctly during part 1. If you were assigned to role B, you
will not receive any payment for part 1.
Moreover, each participant B was randomly assigned to two participants A, i.e.
one participant B and two participants A form a group of three. This assignment
is random and anonymous. No participant learns the identity of the participants
assigned to him, neither during nor after the experiment.
Based on the number of correctly solved problems in part 1, your rank within a
ranking from 1 to 22 will be determined. For this ranking your number of correctly
solved problems will be compared to the number of correctly solved problems of
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21 other participants. These 21 participants have already completed part 1 of this
experiment in this laboratory at an earlier point of time. In the following, we
refer to the “former experiment”. The former participants had exactly the same
instructions as you in part 1.
The ranking is generated as follows:
The participant (either you or a participant of the former experiment) who solved
the most problems correctly obtains rank 1. He who solved the second most prob-
lems correctly obtains rank 2, and so on. The participant with the lowest number
of correctly solved problems obtains rank 22. If two participants (two participants
of the former experiment or you and a participant of the former experiment) solved
the same number of problems correctly, the one who solved less exercises falsely
obtains the higher rank. If this number coincides as well, both participants obtain
the same rank and the following (lower) rank is not assigned. Note that you will
solely be compared to the participants of the former experiment. Your rank is
independent of the other attending participants. Note that a higher rank equals
a smaller number (e.g. rank 6 is a higher rank than rank 12. Rank 12 is a lower
rank than rank 6).
Assessment:
Each participant A estimates his rank in this ranking from 1 to 22.
In each group, one of the two participants A will be selected based on the assess-
ments of both participants A. The actual rank of the selected participant A will
be relevant for the payment of participant B in his group, as described below. In
each group, the participant A who assessed himself on a higher rank (i.e.
he who stated the smaller number at his assessment) will be selected. If both
participants assess themselves on the same rank, it is randomly decided who is
selected.
For the time being, participant B learns the rank-assessments of both participants
A, and at the end of the experiment, he also learns their actual ranks.
[The preceding sentence is replaced as follows in Treatment NoInfo: Participant
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B learns the rank-assessments of both participants A but not their actual ranks.]
Participant B also estimates his rank, his assessment does not affect other partic-
ipants and is not paid.
Example “selection”: In a group, participant A1 estimates that his rank is 12.
The other participant A2 estimates that his rank is 6. The participant A2 who
estimated that his rank is 6 is chosen for the payment of participant B.
Payment Part 2:
Participant A receives 50 points if his assessment exactly matches his actual rank.
If that is not the case, he receives 0 points.
Participant B receives a payment that depends on the actual rank of the selected
participant A in his group.
Participant B receives the following number of points: (22− rank) · 3.
The payment of participant B is higher, the higher the rank.
With a probability of 1/2, the relevant rank for the payment of participant B is
the actual rank of the selected participant A. With a probability of 1/2, it is a
rank between 1 and 22, which is determined randomly by the computer, where
each rank between 1 and 22 is equally likely.
At the end of the experiment, participant B learns the actual ranks of both partic-
ipants A who have been assigned to him and whether his payment was determined
by the actual rank of the selected participant A or by the randomly drawn rank.
[The preceding sentence reads as follows in Treatment NoInfo: Participant B does
neither learn the actual ranks of the participants A who have been assigned to him
nor whether his payment was determined by the actual rank of the selected partic-
ipant A or by the randomly determined rank.]
Example “payment”:
In one group, a participant A1 estimates that his rank is 12. His actual rank is
12. The other participant A2 estimates that his rank is 6. His actual rank is 9.
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Participant A1 guessed his rank correctly and receives 50 points for his assessment,
participant A2’s assessment is wrong and he receives 0 points for his assessment.
Participant A2 guessed a higher rank for himself than did participant A1. There-
fore, participant A2 is selected for the payment of participant B. With a probability
of 1/2 participant B receives a payment of (22−9)·3 points = 39 points, i.e. the ac-
tual rank of the selected participant A is relevant. With a probability of 1/2 a rank
r between 1 and 22 is chosen randomly and participant B receives (22−r)·3 points.
Information of the participants:
Participant A learns:
• after submitting his assessment: whether he was selected or not
• at the end of the experiment: his actual rank
Participant B learns:
• after the submissions of the evaluations: the estimated rank of the selected
as well as of the not selected participant A
• at the end of the experiment: the actual rank of the selected as well as of
the not selected participant A
[Information of participant B in treatment NoInfo:
Participant B learns:
• after the submissions of the evaluations: the estimated rank of the selected,
as well as of the not selected participant A
• the actual ranks of both participants A
• whether his payment was determined by the actual rank of the selected par-
ticipant A or by the randomly determined rank ]
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